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1 Introduction
Political lotteries have a long history in the democratic tradition. In ancient Athens, over
7,000 government officials were chosen by lot, in a practice called sortition, including the
governing assembly called the Council of 500 (Colomer, 2014). Ancient Rome also practiced
variations of sortition, and so did Italian city-states, notably Florence and Venice, from the
medieval to the Renaissance periods (Tridimas, 2002). Both Spain and England used such
procedures for magistrates and municipal councils in the 15th and 16th centuries (Engelstad,
1989), and regions in Switzerland appointed the office of mayor by lot as late as 1837 (Elster,
1989). Sortition affects political selection, behavior, and outcomes: studies have shown
lotteries in the earliest democracy in Athens ensured equal opportunity for individuals from
all socio-economic groups (Taylor, 2007), and in the medieval Florentine Republic leader
selection by lottery ensured rotation among competing business elites (Abramson, 2016).
The selection of entire governing bodies by sortition, however, is no longer a common
feature of contemporary democratic institutions.1 Instead, random selection has been in-
corporated into parts of the selection of political office. We define such a practice as a
lottery-based procedure: a selection process that incorporates an element of randomization,
but falls short of pure sortition.
There are a number of examples in the context of legislative assemblies. Committee se-
niority rankings and assignment orders are partially determined by lottery in the US Congress
(Kellerman and Shepsle, 2009) and the German Bundestag (Buchstein and Hein, 2009), re-
spectively. Ties in the election of presiding officers use lotteries in eight European countries
(Rasch, 1995), and both the British and Indian parliaments randomly select the set of ques-
tions to the prime minister (Wallack, 2008). Victorian Britain employed a lottery to choose
judges for electoral corruption trials (Eggers and Spirling, 2014), and lotteries decide which
private member bills will be considered in Britain (Bowler, 2010), Canada (Loewen et al,
2014), and New Zealand (Williams and Indridason, 2014). The introduction of lotteries
is becoming increasingly salient in the dialogue on political reform. Buchstein and Hein
(2009) argue for introducing a lottery element in the appointment processes of the European
Union.Van Reybrouck (2016) provides an extensive case to reintroduce sorition to elected
1The American jury system is an exception.
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bodies, and selecting the second chamber by sortition has been suggested for the UK House
of Lords (Barnet and Carty, 2009), and the French Assembly (in Ségolène Royal’s 2007
presidential platform).
Here we focus exclusively on lottery-based procedures in the selection of parliamentary
or constitutional committees.2 Yet there are few studies that empirically analyze the effects
of lottery-based procedures on the types of politicians selected and their subsequent policy
choices. Studies of the randomization of seniority or committee exile in the US Congress
(Broockman and Butler 2012; Kellerman and Shepsle 2009; Grimmer and Powell 2013) or
of committee appointment in 19th century France (Authors, 2016) focus on the benefits to
committee service, but not on the incentives that this type of political selection gives to
emerging parties for changing the rules. Are there strategic reasons to introduce lottery-
based procedures, and what consequences can we expect for political selection and behavior
in parliamentary committees?
This paper considers the use of lottery-based rules in newly formed legislative institutions
in 19th century Europe, during the process of parliamentarization. We hypothesize that the
initial adoption of lottery-based procedures was to prevent capture of early institutions by
factions, or groups of self-interested political elites. These procedures were able to play such
a role for two reasons. First, lottery-based rules decrease the potentially harmful influence
of political factions by adding unpredictability to the selection process, reducing the ability
of a particular group to subvert the committee for its own ends. Second, lottery-based rules
help ensure more equal access to political office; either by giving a larger set of politicians the
opportunity to compete directly for holding office or the ability to influence the appointment
of those who do.
We set out our hypotheses of lottery-based procedures for political selection and behavior
in a framework in which weak or strong parties hold different preferences. By design, lottery-
based procedures emphasize individual skills or expertise over group affiliation, and reduce
the influence of organized groups. It is clear that organized parties would favor institutional
procedures that give advantages to groups, namely election or appointment; but in the
2While outside the scope of this paper, outside the legislative arena, randomly assigned focus groups (in
the UK, see Goodin, 2008) or deliberative polling (Fishkin 2011) have shown that such groups are equally
capable of analyzing public policy as elites.
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context of weak parties, early institution builders purposefully used lottery-based procedures
at least partly in order to protect their new institutions from potentially pernicious elites.
As parties become stable, and threat of factions disappear, then the costs of lottery-based
procedures outweigh the benefits. It follows that organizational strength of parties drives the
choice to implement lottery-based procedures; the adoption then dissolution of lottery-based
procedures can be explained by changes in the parliamentarization of the parties. As parties
become stable, and threat of factions disappear, then the costs of lottery-based procedures
outweigh the benefits.
To further test our hypotheses, we turn to one case in more detail. We discuss the
adoption of a lottery-based procedure to select members for the powerful budget committee
in the French Third Republic, using a micro-level dataset of French deputies from 1877 to
1914. The budget committee was a yearly, standing committee formed of 33 members tasked
with reviewing and proposing amendments to the government’s budget proposals. This
committee was the only standing committee that was consistently appointed since the start
of the republic in 1870. For the first three decades of the republic, a lottery-based procedure
to select budget committee members was in place. Each year, the French legislature was
divided into 11 randomly assigned bureaux; each bureau met briefly to appoint 3 members
to the powerful budget committee and was then dissolved.
We find that while this procedure was in place, younger, centrist, and middle class
deputies were consistently more likely to be selected at the expense of wealthy elites.3 The
dismantling of the bureaux system in 1910 also shows the relationship between parliamenta-
rization and party development; we show that parties that had become cohesive were more
likely to support the reform bill that gave partisan control over committee selection. Further,
once parties gained control over committee appointments, not only is there evidence they
once again favored elites in the selection process, but that they used their powers to select
loyal party members.
We then find further support for our arguments about the adoption, consequences, and
3While such individual factors systematically favored appointment, the consequences of the random el-
ement in the composition of the bureaus introduced by the lottery were not trivial. Authors (2016) find
that particularly those deputies lucky to be at the winning end of the randomisation were more likely to be
appointed to the budget committee. These lucky deputies would also become more likely to later submit
budget-related legislative amendments and to be promoted to a ministerial position.
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discontinuation of lottery-based procedures from a number of 19th century parliamentary
arenas, including Imperial Germany (1871), Denmark (1848), the Netherlands (1815), and
Austria (1875). All countries incorporated lottery-based procedures in committee systems
in the early stages of parliamentary development, in the context of weak party systems
consisting of loosely organized ‘proto-parties.’ The primary rationale for their adoption is
strikingly similar across a variety of contexts: they were used among widespread distrust
for new political factions, and in order to ensure more egalitarian distribution of key posts.
These procedures were typically dismantled or subverted once parties were organized enough
to control legislative activity. Lottery-based procedures thus played a gatekeeping role during
the transformation of emerging parliamentary groups to unified, cohesive political parties.
This paper proceeds as follows. First, we discuss our theoretical expectations for how
lottery-based procedures within committee structures affect political selection. Based on
these expectations, we can hypothesize why young parliaments would want to adopt such
procedures and why more institutionalized parties would later want to abolish them again.
In Section 3 we review the case of France in detail, which we will use to conduct a test
of our theoretical claims. In Section 4, we outline our data and research design, and then
provide evidence consistent with our hypotheses for political selection. More cohesive parties
eventually vote to abolish lotteries, and are more likely to appoint loyal members after they
gain control over committee appointments. The next section, Section 5, lends further support
to our arguments by providing several other examples of lottery-based procedures in 19th
century parliamentary systems. Our paper concludes by discussing the contribution of our
research to the literature on legislative institutions in new democracies.
2 Rationale for Lottery-based Procedures
Democratic theory has long argued the benefits of selection by lot. Thinkers like Aristotle,
Montesquieu and Rousseau considered sortition to be the only truly democratic process,
and all other forms of selection to be of an aristocratic nature (Engelstad, 1989). Political
lotteries are often motivated in political theory by criteria of fairness: they might improve
representation of diverse groups and more evenly distribute the benefits and training of
political office. Lottery-based procedures, however, share characteristics of both lotteries and
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human selection. Thus even partial lotteries could enhance the legitimacy of the new system
among diverse groups, particularly if lottery-based selection is combined with regular rotation
of those holding the office. But how do such procedures differ in expectation compared to
other forms of selection? What explains why actors would agree to partial lotteries? Who
benefits from the lottery-based procedures, and who can be expected to favor a change to
elections or appointments?
2.1 Sortition, lottery-based procedures, elections and appoint-
ments
In order to study the use of lottery-based procedures in committee selection, we must first
distinguish this procedure from other selection methods used to allocate higher office. Here,
we discuss four types of committee selection, ranging from pure random selection to appoint-
ment: sortition, lottery-based procedures, election within parliament, and appointment by
parties. Each selection procedure has different implications for both the probability of an
individual obtaining a committee post, and the resulting composition of that committee.
We focus on how the various options influence the probability of selection, the committee
composition, incentives for the individual legislator, and incentives for political parties.
Sortition. While pure sortition of legislative committees is rare, it serves as an important
conceptual counterfactual. Above all, lotteries ensure equal selection probabilities. The
completely random allocation of committee positions ensures that each legislator has the
same chance of being chosen. Over multiple draws, lotteries also result in a committee that
is more or less representative of the chamber on average; however, individual draws can be
biased due to pure chance. In this, lotteries are susceptible to concerns about legitimacy;
when faced with an unpleasant draw and corresponding extreme outcomes, citizens could
be quick to doubt the honesty of the process of drawing lots (Elster, 1989).In terms of
incentives, lotteries introduce uncertainty – neither individuals nor parties have influence
over the selection process. For a politician, random selection potentially eliminates those
most qualified or interested in political office and removes the incentive to invest in either
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skill acquisition or party membership.4 For a political party, randomization undermines a
group’s influence in the committee (since its strength depends on the draw), and committee
assignments cannot be used as sticks or carrots to incentivize party loyalty. On the positive
side, randomisation shelters politicians from influences of corruption or special interests
before selection. It can also reduce the ex ante one-sided influence of powerful groups, and
ensure more equal representation of minority interests.
Elections and Appointments. If lotteries and lottery-based procedures are mechanical in
that they remove the human element, on the other side of the spectrum are elections and
appointments. While two separate procedures, the selection of committees by parliamentary
election and the appointment of committees by parties are similar in political selection that is
driven by the preferences of organized – and often majority – groups. Selection probabilities
are biased and unequal, and entirely a function of the groups that control a majority in
the chamber, either because the individual is elected with the support of the party in the
chamber, or directly chosen by party. Committee composition will also reflect the preferences
of such groups. For an individual politician trying to negotiate a spot on a committee, there
are high incentives to invest in party membership and loyalty, as well as skill. For a party, the
use of these procedures transform committee assignments into powerful selective incentives
that can be used to reward or punish member behavior.
Lottery-based procedures. If sortition removes the human element from the selection
process, a lottery-based procedure simply restricts it. Generally, the unrestricted pursuit
of political office is typically dominated by the wealthy and well-resourced elites. Lotteries
help ensure more equal access to political office (Manin, 1997; Stone 2009; Lopez Guerra
2010), and in this, the procedure is distinctly non-partisan (Sutherland, 2004). Lottery-
based procedures combine these features with those of partisan election, and differ from
the other types in that they are typically a two stage process – the chamber is randomly
assigned into groups in the first stage, and then those groups select the committee members
in the second. The first stage mirrors the expectations found in lotteries – equal selection
probabilities, and uncertainty as a result of randomizing that makes it much more difficult
4This is why even in democratic Athens the important executive functions of the generals who decided
on military interventions and strategy, were not assigned by lot. Artistotle was reportedly against sortition
for magistrates, which required at least some skill (Tridimas, 2012).
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for a specific group to stack the deck in order to advance its interests within a deliberative
body. This undermines elite coordination and influence.
Yet the second stage, where committee members are selected, involves a human choice
element. This affects behavior in a different way. Negotiating for a committee position, even
within a small randomly selected group, would require the acquisition of skill or expertise
(as in election or appointment). Party affiliation could also matter, depending on the draw;
yet lottery-based procedures still greatly reduce the ability of parties to significantly affect
assignments. Thus lottery-based procedures combine institutional elements to incorporate
more equal selection probabilities, emphasize investment individual skills or expertise over
group affiliation, and reduce the influence of specific parliamentary groups in the selection
process.
2.2 Adoption of lottery-based procedures
We highlighted the advantages and disadvantages of choosing various methods of selection,
and how lottery-based procedures fit into the potential set of options. Preferences of emerging
parties over lottery-based procedures are a function of accurate expectations of outcomes
resulting from such rules. Lottery-based procedures should emphasize individual skills or
expertise over group affiliation, and reduce the influence of organized groups. When can we
expect parties to prefer such procedures? And how do the adoption and dissolution of such
legislative procedures relate to partisan development?
We argue that the structure of the party system, particularly the organization of the
parties themselves, influenced the adoption of lottery-based procedures. We take as our
starting point a standard definition of political party, namely a political group, defined by
a label and stable membership, whose members act in concert to achieve goals of political
office, election, or policy (Sartori 1976, Aldrich 1995, Schumpeter 1962). In this study we
focus on democratizing parliaments, and therefore our actors of interest are emerging proto-
parties. In 19th century Europe, party organizations typical began as internally created
groups within parliament (Duverger, 1954). It is true some groups were more externally
based than others (i.e. the small but rising Socialist currents), most began as elite- based
’cadre’ parties, and were so in the context of our study.
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Drawing from the literature on party institutionalization, we identify criteria by which
to assess the weakness of early parliamentary groups: i) stability in membership and party
label, ii) formal party organization, and iii) stable intraparty competition (Mainwairing and
Scully, 1995; Levitsky, and Cameron, 2003; Lupu and Riedl, 2013). First, strong parties have
a meaningful party label and defined membership, and the party as an organization must be
be valuable in and of itself (that is, the group must exist outside a set of personalistic lead-
ers). Second, the party should exhibit organizational stability, in the routinization of rules,
procedures, end expectations governing the group.5 Third, parties must exist across electoral
cycles, in a way that demonstrates at least some continuity among party alternatives.
Thus parties that have stability in membership, continuity, and internal organization we
term organized, or ’strong’. Most importantly, it means that these party groups could viably
contest and compete for power under appointment-based procedures. For these reasons, it
is clear that organized parties would favor institutional procedures that give advantages to
groups, namely election or appointment. Both procedures anchor the probability of selection
to group membership, and increase the probability that the committee will consist of mem-
bers from and reflect the preferences of the organized groups. In addition, parties can use
committee assignments as selective incentives to further induce loyalty by rewarding loyalists
or punishing defectors. Given this, strong parties would want appointment or election.
Weakly organized parties, however, prefer institutional procedures that reduce the influ-
ence of specific groups and ensure more egalitarian selection. Weak party systems, while
common in a new democracy, are often characterized by multiple groups with fluid mem-
bership, shifting or personalistic leadership, and the reinvention of the group from one term
to the next. This increases uncertainty, and makes bargaining over committee seats and
policy more unpredictable. As a result, when choosing committee selection procedures, the
chamber may not want to delegate selection power or influence over committee composition
exclusively to weak or unknown groups.
In this paper we argue that the initial adoption of lottery-based procedures to appoint
committees across 19th century Europe occurred in a context in which institution builders
5One could also include electoral stability in this condition, defined as consistent support and regularized
expectations or norms from voters. Since the parties that form the basis of our study are primarily not based
in the electorate during this period of time, we do not discuss this dimension here.
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wanted to prevent capture of early legislative institutions by factions, or groups of self-
interested political elites. Particularly when parties are weak, the process of establishing
parliamentary or constitutional committees is susceptible to elite capture, and early insti-
tutional configurations can have path dependent effects on long term development of the
parliament. This was the case in the United States, France, and Great Britain, where early
political parties were viewed as elite-driven factions that existed as a threat to democracy,
and maintaining the stability of new republican institutions was a real concern (Colomer,
2014).
Lottery-based procedures are an effective way to guard against elite capture, because
lottery-based procedures play a “sanitizing role” (Stone 2009), by protecting the selection
process from those who would “subvert the process for their own ends” (Dowlen 2009).
Scholars have argued this anti-factional, anti-partisan role was the rationale behind the
adoption of sortition for the governing committees in the early republics of Athens, Florence,
and Venice; such procedures reduced the ability of one party or family to develop a permanent
power base (Dowlen 2009; Engelstad 1989). Under this selection rule, while the committee
composition may be uncertain because of biases in the selection process, it will not be
dominated by one particular group.
We know that politicians embrace institutional reform or change rules when it is in their
interest (Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010), and historically, we often see legislative institutional
procedures evolve to coordinate political activities when parties are weak (Krehbiel 1993;
Dogan, 1979). In our cases, early institution builders purposefully used lottery-based pro-
cedures to protect their new institutions from potentially pernicious elites. In our case, in
such an uncertain context with weak parties, the chamber may be more willing to put formal
procedures in place that ensure equal access to political office and reduce the potential for
partisan bargaining in selection in the face of a shifting party system.6 Randomisation is
also a decision rule that constitution writers can unanimously agree to, a characteristic that
is unlikely to hold for decision by majority rule (Buchannan and Tullock, 1969). Lottery-
based rules were known to the institutional designers of the 19th century, and lottery-based
6This is similar to logic to work that looks at using legislation to constrain bureaucratic autonomy. Huber
and Shipan (2002) argue that in when anticipated policy conflict is high, legislators use more detailed statues
to instruct bureaucrats.
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rules offered the clear benefits of improving access to political office while still retaining an
element of selection.
In the absence of strong parties, lottery-based procedures played an important role in
regulating legislative committees. If the rationale for lottery-based parliamentary procedures
was to protect the institution from weak or self-interested factions, then it follows that their
removal is related to party development. In the context of weakly organized parties and high
uncertainty, lottery-based procedures have clear advantages over election or appointment.
However, as these conditions change as the party system develops, we should see a change
in preferences. As parties become stable, and the threat of factions disappear, then the
costs of lottery-based procedures outweigh the benefits. Parties want selection to depend on
their membership, and want control over assignments to use as selective incentives. Thus it
follows that organizational strength of parties drives the choice to implement lottery-based
procedures; the adoption then dissolution of lottery-based procedures can be explained by
changes in the parliamentarization of the parties.
The next section builds on this, and analyzes the effect of lottery-based procedures on
elite selection and party development, using micro-level data from the Third Republic. To
our knowledge, our paper is the first to explore how lottery-based procedures might govern
early institutions until parties can consolidate.
3 The Case of France
Were the early constitution builders correct in their assumption that lottery-based procedures
can undermine elite advantage? More specifically, how did lottery-based rules affect access to
political office? We can use micro-level data in the French case to answer these questions. Our
goal is to uncover to what extent the lottery-based procedure undermined elite advantage
and gave entree to the new political class, and how this affected early partisan politics.
Further, we examine the removal of lottery based procedures, and how this relates to partisan
development. As we will show in France, the dismantling of the procedure coincides with
the consolidation of parliamentary groups into organized parties, in this case the first official
documentation of party membership in lists in 1910.
The French Third Republic incorporated a lottery-based procedure in committee ap-
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pointments, for the powerful budget committee in the Chamber of Deputies. The regime
began in 1871, and during this time the parliament of the Third Republic was active and
influential. The budget committee was an annual standing body with extensive control over
the government’s budget that rivaled even the cabinet for influence.7 It was also the only
standing committee for much of the regime. To select the 33 members of the annual budget
committee, France incorporated an element of randomization in the first part of the selection
process. The approximately 580 members of the chamber were divided into 11 randomly as-
signed bureaux. Then each bureau met and within hours, selected 3 members to serve on
the budget committee.
The practice of division into groups using a randomized system of bureaux was estab-
lished a century prior to this, during the French Revolution. Bureaux were first utilized in the
National Constituent Assembly, a body formed during the French Revolution by the Third
Estate with the purpose of governing and drafting a constitution for the revolutionary regime
(Mill, 1848). Bureaux drawn by lot reviewed proposals and elected committees responsible
for drafting the text of the constitution. They were subsequently incorporated in the orga-
nization of the first Legislative Assembly in 1791, where they gained the power to elect the
President and secretaries of the assembly as well as committee members (Frederiksen, 1936).
Historical evidence shows the lottery-based procedure was introduced for two reasons.
First, the Constituent Assembly consisted of over 1200 members; by dividing the groups into
bureaux, this could both induce a form of organization and a more efficient division of labor.
This is the identical rationale for the creation of modern day committees. But, even more
importantly, the creation of the bureaux procedure directly related to power struggles in the
new republic. Randomly selecting deputies on a frequent basis would prevent the formation
of ‘cliques’ and partisan behavior (Frederiksen, 1936), and counteract ‘local and provincial
loyalties’ (Dawson, 1972). For the next century, the system of bureaux and the idea of
legislative organization via commissions would be used in the various republics and empires
prior to 1870 (Bodley 1898). When the Third Republic was established, the bureaux system
was incorporated into the legislative rules of procedure governing the budget committee.
As we will demonstrate, the bureaux system was strategically retained for over 30 years
7The budget committee was a more stable institution; cabinets fell on average every 8 months, while the
budget committee was consistently appointed yearly throughout the entire regime.
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to protect the unlimited individual initiative of deputies from partisan demands, and more
broadly to prevent capture of the committee by various political cartels (Gooch, 1928; Usher,
1906). That is because for most of this era, parties were “cadre parties” (Duverger, 1954),
consisting of loose parliamentary factions of high profile elites. Early parties existed only in
the parliamentary arena, and on the ideological spectrum, the chamber was dominated by
monarchists and conservatives on the far right, a rising contingent of socialists and radical-
socialists on the left, with a heterogeneous set of Radical parties in the center-right. Re-
turning to our definition of party weakness, while French parties exhibited some degree of
internal organization,8 they were lacking stability in membership and continuity, and there
was instability in intraparty competition and membership. Party alternatives dissolved and
reassembled each term, and membership was fluid. Multiple affiliations were common until
the turn of the century; for example, as late as 1898 as much as 30% percent of the deputies
held membership in two separate parliamentary parties. Particularly in the early years of
the regime, French institution builders were concerned not only about weak parties, but the
influence of aristocratic or anti-republican factions at the expense of minority groups.
The rationale for the use of the bureaux system is best presented by the deputies them-
selves, during the parliamentary debates that discussed standing committees in the 1880s,
1902, and finally 1910. Here, it is clear that deputies were worried about the fledgling party
system. Advocates of the bureaux invoked two important arguments for the preservation of
the lottery-based procedure. First, that there existed some factions that were hostile to the
Republic, and the idea of democratic institutions.9
Second, deputies defended the system of bureaux by arguing that not only should deputies
retain the non-partisan freedom to represent local constituents as they saw fit, but that
parties were not yet unified enough to control committee assignments. As Lemire argued,
“If I speak to you, socialists, it is because you are the only ones who are unified. But when I
address others, the Radical Socialists, for example, I do not know where the party starts!”10
Historians outside of France also agree that the bureaux system served to check partisan
activity (Bodley, 1898; Gooch, 1928). Woodrow Wilson (1911), in one of his seminal texts,
8 Each parliamentary group was governed nominally by a committee, but these played no extraparlia-
mentary or electoral function.
9Marcus Sibille, July 1, 1910, Journal Officiel.
10Lemire, July 1, 1910, Journal Officiel.
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addresses the French system:
“It will be seen that this arrangement, making the composition of the Bureaux
dependent upon lot, as it does, and providing for the monthly reconstitution
alike of the bureaux and of the committees which they select, must effectually
prevent the recognition or maintenance of party lines in the formation either of
the Bureaux or of the committees, and seems in that way very well adapted to
check the factional ardors of the chamber.”
On the other side of the debate, proponents of partisan control complained about per-
verse outcomes, in that the system could allocate politicians with the same skill set into
one bureaux and only three could advance. They also sought guaranteed representation for
minorities, arguing this would benefit the chamber; as the Socialist leader Jaurès stated
“Gentlemen, let me tell you that the fair representation of all parties in all major commit-
tees is not only the guarantee of minorities, it is the guarantee of the majorities.”11 This
viewpoint finally prevailed in 1910, when the lottery-based procedure was dissolved and the
committee system was successfully reformed to give parliamentary groups control over com-
mittee assignments. Instead of election via the bureaux, committee positions were allocated
proportionally to political parties, who then filled these slots using party-controlled lists.
Why in 1910? This coincides with membership stability and group continuity. Parlia-
mentary groups were more clearly defined, and had consistently appeared the two terms
prior. Deputies had stopped holding multiple affiliations, and the widespread use of official
party labels in the electorate began with the 1906 term (Cole and Campbell, 1989; Hanley,
2006). Political associations had been made legal in 1901. The transition from weak to orga-
nized parties is made most evident by the first ever formal registration of party membership
lists, as a result of the reform in 1910. Considering that for most of the 19th century in
France, “the game of political labels became so subtle that it has no counterpart in other
Western democracies” (Dogan, 1979, page 13) the fact that affiliations were published in
the publicly available Journal Official is evidence of a clear transition from weak to orga-
nized parties. Once parties had consolidated into more unified actors, they removed the
lottery-based procedure.
11Jean Jaurès, July 1, 1910, Journal Officiel
14
3.1 Data
Here we analyze how the bureaux system affected the type of politicians who made it into
office, and we choose to focus on elites. To do so, we rely on a micro-level dataset of
deputies in the Chamber of Deputies, from 1881 to 1914. We collected information on yearly
committee appointments, bureaux lists, and legislative activity and matched this to district-
level electoral outcomes for the entire period. We also collected biographical information on
deputy qualifications and careers.
We base our analysis of deputy selection on the categorization that mattered most to the
new French Republic: the division between the landholding elite and the bourgeoise, or the
rising middle class. In the 19th century, the major bases of society were the elites, middle
classes, peasants and workers (Price, 1987), though only the first two could realistically serve
as a deputy in the chamber. But by the Third Republic, aristocratic influence had markedly
declined in parliament. On the other side of the spectrum, until 1900 less than a third of of
deputies came from the lower ranks of the bourgeoisie (Mayeur, 1975; Dogan, 1979). Instead,
the new elites were the wealthy, influential land or capital owners, and the rising professional
occupations of the grand bourgeoisie (liberal professions such as lawyers, doctors, professors,
or bankers), and they played a dominant role in politics.
We identify a number of deputy characteristics that would indicate a member of the
elite political class, and contrast these with members of the rising middle class. Here we
rely on occupational data, taken from the district-level electoral results that provided the
qualifications of candidates. We first create a variable to measure the elite, or the landed
classes. This is an indicator variable, Elite, and includes landowners, landlords, and owners
of capital (such as factories).12 As Table 1 demonstrates, this group tended to be older,
from less competitive and smaller districts, and associated with the right or progressives.
Importantly for our analysis, these elites had the wealth and influence to dominate early
institutions.
Similarly, we create a variable to measure the upper middle class, called Bourgeois
or those deputies with professional occupations that were not landholders. This included
12We exclude those with small holdings, such as farmers, and industrial occupations, or non-owners; these
are not part of the elite class.
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lawyers, bankers, doctors, professions, journalists, and similar liberal occupations (McPhee,
2004). These deputies were younger, with professional degrees, from more competitive dis-
tricts, and more likely to support Radical and pro-republican ideals. Outside these two
categories, the rest of the deputies in Other Classes are more heterogeneous and have
less clear predictions; these include middle class but lower ranking professions such as clerks,
engineers; or alternative professions such as priest or military. Still, this category is useful
because by construction it is missing wealth and influence, and thus provides a comparison
group.
Further, we are interested in the extent to which the lottery-based procedure affected
the representation of various parliamentary factions. In the French case, deputies could hold
multiple affiliations for most of the period in question, and party membership was not defined
as in the modern sense. Using information on individual party faction affiliation, from both
published lists and newspapers of the time, we code individuals as belonging to one of five
main political and ideological blocs throughout this period. These were the conservatives,
progressives, radicals, radical-soclialists, and socialists. Each bloc would typically be formed
from 2 to 5 parliamentary factions. Both the conservative right and extreme left factions
were small in this era, each ranging from 5 to 20% of the chamber, and correspondingly
the Radical groups were the major force in the center. The Radicals as an ideological
grouping held plurality, however, Radical groups were also the most heterogeneous and
least organized (Hanley, 2006) – anywhere from 3 to 4 party groups would make up the
Radical current. To measure centrist tendencies of deputies, we create an indicator variable,
Centrist, to measure whether a deputy had any affiliation with a Radical or Radical
Socialist parliamentary grouping. Figure 1 demonstrates the breakdown of parliamentary
current by our elite variables.
We also include a number of variables that could measure political influence. We look
at the age of the deputy, Age, as well as the parliamentary experience, Exp, of the deputy,
both measured in years. Particularly in the early years of the regime, older deputies who
had experienced the prior empire were more likely to be both privileged and of a different
mindset than the younger, new republican generation. Prior experience is controlled for using
whether the deputy was an Incumbent, or had served in the prior term, and whether the
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Figure 1: Deputy Type by Party Group
deputy was a Budget Incumbent, and had served in the most recent budget committee.
We also rely on a measure of partisan behavior, by looking at the patterns of party
switching for each deputy. Disloyal is an individual-level indicator that measures whether
a deputy had switched parties in the 1906 term, right before the party reform gave control
over budget appointments. Switcher is a variable that measures by term whether a deputy
switched party groups in 1906 or in 1910 (compared to 1902). Access to political resources is
measured using Dual Mandate, or whether the deputy held a local office (such as mayor,
or municipal councilor) in addition to his national post.13 Civil measures whether the
deputy had prior experience in the civil service, such as serving as a tax collector, notary,
postmaster, or any non-elected profession in local government, and Dynastic, measures
whether a deputy had a relative in politics previously. Finally, we include a battery of district
controls, including district size, margin of victory in the election, whether the district was
in Paris.
13A dual mandate could give a deputy access to local patronage resources and a stable electoral base, see
Author 2016.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Elite Bourgeois Other Classes
N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D.
Civil† 5,068 0.14 0.35 9,971 0.12 0.33 9,610 0.18 0.38
Dynastic† 5,068 0.30 0.46 9,971 0.17 0.38 9,610 0.17 0.37
Paris† 5,068 0.02 0.15 9,971 0.06 0.24 9,610 0.11 0.31
Centrist† 4,067 0.33 0.47 7,319 0.53 0.50 6,108 0.37 0.48
Switcher† 5,068 0.15 0.35 9,971 0.15 0.36 9,610 0.11 0.31
Disloyal (in 1906)† 190 0.28 0.45 379 0.21 0.40 221 0.15 0.36
Dual mandate† 5,068 0.15 0.35 9,971 0.41 0.49 9,610 0.35 0.48
Budget incumbent† 5,068 0.02 0.13 9,971 0.05 0.23 9,610 0.05 0.21
Incumbent† 5,068 0.64 0.48 9,971 0.62 0.49 9,610 0.51 0.50
Exp 5,068 8.79 7.32 9,971 7.85 6.42 9,610 6.50 5.58
Age 5,068 52.79 11.14 9,971 49.51 10.83 9,610 51.44 10.66
Electoral margin 5,019 28.68 27.93 9,839 26.90 26.99 9,338 23.83 25.24
Electorate (in 000s) 5,023 27.68 35.92 9,863 29.60 47.07 9,358 39.53 73.72
† indicates dummy variable.
Finally, any analysis of lottery-based rules requires the lottery to work, so we also verified
that the randomization process was correctly implemented. A more detailed discussion of the
finding that the deputies were truly randomly assigned across bureaux can be found in Au-
thors (2016). We executed a number of robustness checks to ensure bureaux were randomly
assigned. We find no systematic differences across bureaux, and pretreatment covariates can-
not systematically predict bureaux assignment. Furthermore, there is no historical evidence
to suggest any occasions of fraud regarding the bureaux system.
3.2 Budget Composition Under Bureaux
We are first interested in the types of politicians selected for the budget committee as a
result of the bureaux system. We first show this by comparing the composition of the
budget committee to the legislature, across the entire period in which the bureaux system
was utilized. In the absence of a lottery-based procedure, our expectation is that endogenous
selection should prioritize the “high demander” outliers (Rowley and Schneider, 2008), in our
case either experienced or wealthy elites who would have a distinct advantage in competing
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for office. Instead, we show that incorporating an element of randomization results in the
selection of different types of politicians.
Using our data, we consider descriptive statistics. Figure 2 plots the composition of
the budget committee and the composition of the entire chamber, over a number of key
characteristics of deputies. It is evident that the budget committee overrepresented middle
class, bourgeois deputies – not elites. Landed elites constituted anywhere from 10 to 30% of
deputies in the chamber, but on average constituted less than 10% of the budget committee.
Similarly, older deputies, who were more likely to be associated with the pre-democratic
empire, were much less likely to be selected, as were deputies with patronage networks
through multiple office holding. Instead, selection in the bureaux overrepresented deputies
who were middle class, young, and had prior experience in the local government.
Next we examine how the bureaux system affected the partisan composition of the budget
committee. One of the purported benefits of the bureaux system was that one parliamentary
faction could not dominate the selection process. Looking at the data across the entire period,
we find this to be the case. The centrist, Radical deputies were more likely to be on the
budget committee under the system of bureaux. However, these parties were also the least
organized and most heterogeneous at the time, typically consisting of 3-4 factions within the
Radical ideological bloc. So while one specific faction was unable to dominate the committee,
the median and centrist ideological bloc was overrepresented.
This result contradicts the expectations of the time. Usher (1902), for example, argued
the budget committee was “more or less out of sympathy” with the majority, because the
system could not ensure the majority could control the committee. We show that instead,
groups in the plurality of the chamber were more likely to be selected in the bureaux. But
what advantaged centrist deputies in committee selection? Details surrounding selection
within the bureaux were never recorded, and so the specifics of selection are unknown.
However, it seems likely that centrist deputies could more easily appeal to the cross section





Age Centrist (Radical) Deputy
Figure 2: Deputy Characteristics,
Chamber versus Budget Committee Under Bureaux
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However, for this period we have no counterfactual. It could be that lottery-based pro-
cedures were eroding elite advantage and allowing the newer political class the ability to
compete, or rather this was the preferences of the chamber at the time. We try to unpack
this by next looking at how selection changed in 1910, when parties gained control over
committee assignments.
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we explore the relationship of the bureaux system to French political parties
in two ways. First, we examine partisan incentives behind institutional reform using an roll
call analysis of the 1910 amendment that dismantled the lottery-based procedure. Second,
we look at the the effects of partisan control on committee selection, to understand how the
composition of the budget committee changed before and after partisan control.
4.1 Empirical strategy
To study our arguments, we now analyse the French case in more detail. First, we ask
who was in favour of reforming the system to abolish the lottery-based procedure. We
argue that those deputies who are organised and believe their party stands to gain from
controlling committee appointments, will vote in favour of the reform. Therefore, we analyse
the roll call vote on the reform bill, and because the dependent variable is a dummy (vote in
favour of reform) we employ a logistic regression with or without a deputy’s 1910 partisan
affiliation. Standard errors are robust. If our hypothesis holds, partisan affiliation should
form a very strong predictor of a deputy’s vote, regardless of his individual characteristics.
Next, we analyse the partial association between any individual characteristic and budget
committee selection, before and after the 1910 reform. Our expectation is that selection is
more egalitarian before parties gain control over the nomination process, or that elites and
bouregeois politicians become more likely to be selected after 1910. Again, we estimate the
appropriate logistic regression, and because individual characteristics cannot change over
time we cluster the standard errors by individual.
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If our hypotheses about political selection under different selection procedures holds,
we should see that individual selection probabilities change after parties gain control over
nominations. We expect these probabilities to become less equal after the lottery-based
procedure is abolished. We expect parties to give preference to more loyal elite members
after they gain control. To further test this hypothesis about the selection of loyal members,
we consider a sample of deputies who were present in both the 1910 term and the preceeding
term of 1906. We then compare their partisan affiliations in 1906 to their affiliation(s) in
1902. We hypothesise that the group of disloyal deputies, who changed affiliations between
1902 and 1906, is less likely to be selected after 1910, when parties gain control, than before
under the more egalitarian lottery-based procedure. We test this hypothesis with a difference-
in-difference analysis, using a logistic regression with individually clustered standard errors.
4.2 Results: Determinants of Support for Bureaux Reform
In 1910, the bureaux system was dismantled and replaced with the election of the budget
committee via party-controlled lists. Opponents of reform submitted a blocking amendment
that would preserve the lottery-based procedure, but this failed 196 to 300, and therefore
paved the way for partisan control of committee selection. As the vote on this bill was a roll
call vote, we can examine how deputy characteristics and party affiliations predicted support
for reform. For a more intuitive interpretation of this blocking amendment, we rescale the
indicator variable such that 1 indicates a vote in support of partisan control and 0 indicates
a vote in support of retaining the bureaux system.
Table 2 presents the results of two logit models, in which we estimate the effect of
belonging to one of the five ideological blocs on voting to dismantle the bureaux system.14
Given the rationale for lottery-based parliamentary procedures was to protect the institution
from weak or self interested factions, then it follows that their removal is related to partisan
preferences. In column 1, we see some effect of individual deputy characteristics, but most
disappear when controlling for partisan group affiliation.
14The results are the same when controlling for the ten parliamentary groups that made up the five
ideological blocs.
22
Table 2: Logit Regression: Roll Call Vote of 1910 Reform
(1) (2)





































Party affiliation controls No Yes
Observations 479 479
Logit regression. Individual controls as in 1, with the exception of centrist to explore party differences.
Base category for party affiliation is independents. Controls not shown include the squared terms of age,
experience, electoral margin, and electorate. Robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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In 1910, the distribution of the chamber by bloc was as follows: Conservatives 9%, Pro-
gressives 13%, Radicals 32%, Radical Socialists 25%, Socialists 19%, and Independents 3%.
Radicals and Radical-Socialists comprised the majority of the seats, meaning they would
be decidedly advantaged in proportional allocation of committee posts. Yet Radicals and
Radical-Socialists were against and smaller groups were in favor of reform. Both specifica-
tions show that being a member of the Conservatives, Progressives, and Socialists results in
a double or even triple increase in the odds of voting in favor of partisan control.
However, it was well known at the time that the smaller groups on each edge of the
ideological spectrum were much more cohesive and organized than the heterogeneous cen-
trist groups in the middle (Hanley, 2006). The Conservative and Socialist factions were
consistently and clearly defined, with stable membership and high internal organization. In
contrast, while Radicals were guaranteed a larger number of committee posts to allocate,
their fluid membership and lack of formal governing structures meant higher uncertainty
and perhaps an inability to properly utilize such a selective incentive. The Radicals and
the Radical Socialists had seen the highest number of group reconfigurations in the terms
preceding 1910, and there was still shifting membership across centrist factions.
Thus we find the more organized and cohesive the party, the less likely its members are to
favor a lottery-based procedure. Furthermore, as presented in the previous section, centrist
deputies were overrepresented under the bureaux. This could explain why Radical groups
were not more likely to vote for the reform – they did not want to relinquish control to party
organizations, because they were advantaged by the lottery-based procedure.
4.3 Results: Selection Under Partisan Control
Here we present further results that demonstrate that lottery-based procedures induced
different selection criteria, by comparing it to an alternative selection mechanism – partisan
control. Here we can compare the selection of the budget committee in 1906 term (under
lottery-based procedure) to 1910 (when parties chose budget committee members). We focus
on a relatively short window, the term before and the term of the change, to see whether
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elites were more likely to be appointed by party leaders.15
Figure 3 plots the estimates for interactions between our variables of interest with an
indicator for the 1910 term. Each interaction measures the marginal change in the prob-
ability of being selected to the budget committee in 1910 after partisan control, given the
characteristic. The key finding from this analysis is that elites were much more likely to be
appointed under partisan control. While the bureaux system undermined the selection of
elites, partisan control increased the likelihood of their selection. Bourgeois deputies were
still likely to be selected, but this effect is much weaker and deputies with civil service expe-
rience has no effect on the probability of serving on the budget committee. Unsurprisingly,
centrist deputies are less likely to be selected, because the proportional allocation of com-
mittee posts based on party strength ensures minorities are going to be represented. Still,
as a result of partisan control, Radical deputies lost some of their influence in the process of
institutional reform.
These results demonstrate the difference between lottery-based procedures and partisan
selection outcomes. Once parties gained control of committee assignments, the types of
politicians appointed changed and elites returned to influential positions of power.
Figure 3: Change in Pr. of Budget Committee Selection Compared to 1906
15We do not look past the 1910 term because by 1914 parliamentary politics was significantly affected by
World War I, and by 1919 the electoral law had been changed.
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4.4 Results: Committee Assignments and Party Loyalty
Our evidence thus far has demonstrated that the bureaux system disadvantaged elites, and
overrepresented young, skilled members of a rising political class, which may indicate the
benefits of a lottery-based procedure. But does this come at a cost for party development?
Or, put another way, does partisan selection potentially benefit political parties?
Finally, we turn to a behavioral measure to analyze how parties may have utilized com-
mittee posts as selective incentives. We use the Disloyal variable, which measures whether
a deputy switched party affiliation in the 1906 term before the reform, to see if parties re-
ward those deputies who had joined their party before the reform, by selecting them onto
the budget committee.
We conduct a simple difference-in-difference comparison for those deputies whom we
observe over both the 1906 and the 1910 term. We then compare those who changed their
affiliations before 1910 to those who did not (Disloyal). Both groups were subject to the
same treatment by which parties took control over nominations in 1910. We can only look
at one term before the onset of the first World War, but the results are suggestive even in
a short time span: parties did not reward deputies who had not been loyal to their party
affiliations once they received control over appointments.
Figure 4: Change in Selection probability for Disloyal deputies (in 1906) in 1910
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Table 3: Logit Regression: Party Loyalty and Budget Selection
(1) (2) (3)
Budget
Disloyal in 1906 -0.780** -1.271** -1.176*
× after 1910 [0.364] [0.642] [0.698]
Disloyal in 1906 0.613* 0.693 0.565
[0.360] [0.451] [0.512]
after 1910 0.780*** 0.977*** 39.153***
[0.180] [0.293] [7.092]
Constant -2.282*** -1.925 -32.897***
[0.195] [2.788] [6.447]
Individual controls No Yes Yes
Party group dummies No Yes Yes
Party group dummies, all interactions after 1910 No No Yes
Observations 790 787 787
Logit regressions. Individual controls as in 1, with the exception of switcher. Base category for
party affiliation is independents. Column 3 includes all interactions with controls and dummies
after 1910. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Figure 4 and Table 3 show the results of this difference-in-difference comparison. We
find that party groups were less likely to appoint disloyal deputies to the budget committee,
indicating that parties perhaps used their newfound ability to reward loyal deputies instead.
Also note that this analysis only includes deputies who had been present in both the 1906
and 1910 terms; so this is not picking up party preferences towards first time deputies.
This might suggest there are clear tradeoffs between lottery-based procedures and par-
tisan selection. Committee assignments are an important asset in the parliamentary arena,
and can be used by party groups as selective incentives to achieve discipline in voting or
membership. Stripped of such tools, early parties may find it more difficult to induce party
cohesion among members. The fact that parties were more likely to appoint loyalists sug-
gests that parties were using committee assignments as such. Our evidence is only suggestive;
both the small time frame and changing parliamentary activity due to World War I make it
difficult to test whether parties continued to use committee assignments as selective incen-
tives. But this could indicate a tradeoff in the use of lottery-based procedures in early party
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development. We leave this for future research.
5 Lottery-based Procedures in 19th century Europe
A number of European countries incorporated lottery-based procedures in nascent committee
systems, in their early stages of parliamentarization. This includes the Netherlands, Imperial
Germany, and the Austrian empire, in legislative bodies under monarchies; Denmark, in the
case of its constitutional convention; and of course France, in its transition to to republican
democracy. Like France, each country faced similar political challenges during the course of
parliamentarization. Each featured highly fragmented or weak party systems, during signif-
icant periods of institutional development. Importantly, in every single country institution
builders incorporated lottery-based procedures in committee systems out of a distrust for
potentially subversive political factions or influential elites. As a result, the use of such rules
were inextricably linked with concerns about institutional capture by political parties or fac-
tions. While suggestive, our broad survey suggests that lottery-based procedures were used
to reduce the influence of elite cartels and then eventually removed with the development of
organized parties.
In Denmark, a lottery-based procedure was adopted in the case of its Constituent As-
sembly of 1848-1849, which resulted in the creation of the constitution that still governs
Denmark to this day. A lottery selected general committees in the Assembly, which helped
develop the initial constitutional proposal and selected members to the powerful Constitu-
tional Committee (Hansen 2016). Here, there is historical evidence that the adoption of the
procedure stemmed from the weakness of the party system, and a desire to ensure fairer
representation of various democratic factions in the building of the constitution. At the
time, there existed up to 11 parties (Olsen 1972; Hansen 2016) organized into political blocs.
The lottery based procedure was adopted to prevent the concentration of political blocs into
any one committee, particularly the radical and pro-democratic left, and therefore prevented
co-optation of the Constitution Committee (Hansen, 2016). This strategy was successful,
and – similar to the French case – partial randomization ensured a newly formed center
played a more dominant part in the proceedings. In this, lottery based procedures succeeded
in playing a temporary but sanitizing role in the creation of the Danish constitution.
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Table 4: 19th Century European Examples
Country Time Period Procedure Context
France Third Republic (1870-
1940)
Each MP randomly assigned to
groups (Bureaux), to then select
committee members




Each MP randomly assigned to






committees, to then select Con-
stitutional Convention members




Each MP randomly assigned to






Each MP randomly assigned to
groups (Afdelingen) to study and
report on legislative proposals
Fear of provincial fac-
tions and dominance
of specialists
Austria, even more so than Denmark, had issues with extreme multipartyism, and also
turned to lottery based procedures. As Lowell wrote, “If France has been a laboratory for
political experiments, Austria-Hungary is a museum of political curiosities.” The empire con-
sisted of provinces that had no natural coherence, and the population consisted of a multitude
of ethnic and nationalist divisions. As a result, Austria was a case of extreme multipartyism -
for example, in 1907 there were 58 parties elected that formed 19 parliamentary clubs (Howe,
2010). The historical record indicates a strong need for institutional rules that mitigated
the contextual challenges. In Austria, a lottery-based procedure was adopted in committee
selection for the lower house of the the parliament, the Reichsrat, founded in 1867.16 The
16This was a result of a compromise that established the dual monarchy of the kingdoms of Austria and
Hungary.
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legislature was divided into nine groups (Abteilungen) by lot, chosen at the beginning of
the legislative session, and then these groups each elected an equal number of members to
the various standing committees (Howe, 2002). Thus the committee system was structured
in a way to remove partisan influence over appointments, and to ensure that one party or
coalition could not suppress minority factions. The fractionalized party system persisted for
the duration of the empire, and parties never truly consolidated, which can help to explain
why the lottery-based procedure remained in place until the first decade of the 20th century.
The Dutch case also used lottery based procedures in legislative committees for an ex-
tended period of time. In the Netherlands, the use of randomization in committees predates
democratization (Hagelstein 1991). The 1815 constitution dictated that all legislative pro-
posals from the king and his ministers should be studied by parliament organized in randomly
assigned groups, called Afdelingen. The 5 divisions would both discuss proposals and nomi-
nate a representative to a Central Bureau, Centrale Afdeling. After partial democratization
in 1848, this system remained in place because of the fear that without the groups experi-
enced or skilled deputies would dominate legislative procedure. The first formally organized,
national party was not established until 1879, but party factions remained weak and ran-
domly drawn groups existed well into the mid 20th century. Similar to the case of France,
the lottery-based procedure was implemented during party fragmentation and endured for a
significant period of time.
In contrast, Germany attempted to utilize lottery based procedures but these were dis-
mantled quickly by relatively organized parties. Germany implemented lottery-based com-
mittee selection in the Reichstag, the parliament of the German Empire from 1871 to 1918.
Procedures in the Reichstag called for dividing the parliament into five divisions by lot, and
these groups would then appoint members to legislative committees (Loewenberg, 2003).
This procedure had been adopted explicitly to ‘circumvent’ party groups; Abteilungen were
intended to be representative and political neutral units (Manow, Schroeder and Nickel,
2011). Yet while parties, or Fraktionen, were not formally recognized in parliament until
1922, constitution builders were extremely wary about the dangers of party factions. As a
result, while the procedures had been adopted to prevent elite capture, groups almost im-
mediately began to subvert committee selection. There is historical evidence that factions
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played an informal role in selection criteria for appointment within the Abteilungen, along
with regional provenance and religious affiliation (Wittreck 2007). Consequently, the insti-
tution existed for a very short period of time – by 1893, organized parliamentary groups
abolished the lottery based procedure, and succeeded in reforming the law to distribute
committee assignments in proportion to party strength.
These 19th century examples demonstrate the strategic use of lottery-based procedures
in 19th century European committees. In all countries, decisive actors were concerned about
the co-option of the institutions by partisan factions in the context of either weak or divisive
party systems. The historical record suggests that this was generally successful. Lottery-
based procedures helped protect the Danish constitution from co-optation by the overly
radical left, in all likelihood provided Austria with a way to manage extreme multipartyism,
and provided a framework for committee selection in the absence of strong parties in France
and regional interests in the Netherlands for decades.
Lottery-based parliamentary procedures also interacted with party development, in that
the adoption or dissolution of such procedures related to the consolidation and strength of
parliamentary groups. Initially weak parties enabled a system of divisions to exist for what
would eventually become over a century in the Netherlands. In France, the dismantling of
the bureaux system coincides with party consolidation. In the contexts of Germany and
Austria, both were monarchies with similar institutional structures but saw divergence in
the organization of groups in parliament – Germany’s parties quickly removed the lottery
based procedure, while Austria’s fractionalized party system kept these rules in place until
the 20th century. This cross national evidence is suggestive, and points to an important
role of lottery-based procedures in regulating legislative activity, until parties are cohesive
enough to take over.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the use of lottery-based rules in newly formed legislative
institutions during the process of parliamentarization in Europe. In the case of the French
Third Republic, we presented evidence that partial randomization in budget committee
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selection process resulted in the appointment of young, skilled, middle class deputies at the
expense of influential elites. However, once party groups regained control of committees in
1910, elites were more likely to be appointed to the budget committee. We also showed
that both the use and dismantling of this system was related to partisan politics; cohesive
parties were more likely to vote for the dismantling of the bureaux system, and we provide
evidence that parties used their newfound influence to reward loyal members with committee
assignments.
We then reviewed the use of such procedures in the 19th century cases of Germany, Aus-
tria, Denmark, and the Netherlands. We showed that these countries had fledgling party
systems and incorporated various selection by lot in legislative committees, and that the
abolishment of such procedures was linked with the consolidation of parliamentary factions.
In these countries, during democratic transitions parties chose a system that guaranteed a
certain level of representation rather than dealing with the uncertainty of who would be
in power. These examples parallel the French case, and provide further evidence that the
rationale behind the use of such procedures related directly to stability in early parliamen-
tarization.
Understanding the role of lottery-based procedures in committee selection is an important
avenue for future research. For example, in the European cases presented here we discussed
how lottery-based procedures were used to form groups to deliberate over legislative policy.
This relates directly to a number of studies that have suggested sortition can be used in the
context of deliberative groups. Randomly assigned focus groups (in the UK, see Goodin,
2008) or deliberative polling (Fishkin, 2011) were found to be equally capable of analyzing
the quality of public policy as elites. More broadly, our findings speak to a bourgeoning
literature on the use of sortition outside of parliament, in the electoral arena. In modern
democracies, sortition is now being considered as a solution to democratic deficits or the
perils of direct democracy (Van Reybrouck, 2016). We have argued that strong parties are
unlikely to favor sortition and that such procedures, when implemented, could quickly lead
to the more organised party factions striving for control over policy formation.
Finally, an interesting result from the French case is that it suggests there are clear
tradeoffs between lottery-based procedures and partisan selection. Committee assignments
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can be an important tool, used by political parties to reward loyal members and develop
long term cohesion. In the French case, while we show that party groups were more likely
to select elites for the budget committee, we also provide suggestive evidence that they used
committee posts to reward loyal members. Thus the advantage of lottery-based procedures
might be most salient in contexts of weak parties and developing institutions; used to bridge
the gap until the regime is stable and political parties are consolidated enough to use the
selective incentives inherent in committee posts.
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